One way to guarantee that a mass database of biometric data isn't leaked or abused is to not gather it in the first place.
So, yes, it is easy to guarantee that a mass database of biometric data isn't abused if you can prevent it from being gathered. We're making no efforts in that direction, so we're running every day towards a future in which the holder of such a database can deepfake anyone doing anything.
Which is why it's so strange to say that one of the greatest risks of the TSA's program is that they could do a totally different program in the future. It's literally like saying that going to the gym is risky because you might get into BASE jumping.
There are better arguments. Hence, this piece is weak.
That is one of the greatest risks, because while you may agree to give them your biometrics for air travel, you may not agree to do it for another purpose, but it's too late at the point where they already have it.
It effectively means that if I don't want them to potentially give it to LEOs, I have to opt out of any services they are gatekeeping behind it.
That's not a slippery slope argument, it's an argument that there is no way for me to review how the information they collect is actually being used.
I don't think you read the EPIC post, or the part I quoted. You're creating a new, more reasonable argument that is loosely aligned with the second, lesser concern that EPIC had.
I wonder if when these things leak and become ever-more damaging, biometrics will basically become worthless and we will pivot to hardware tokens or something else.
There seems to be little resistance to this in the USA, and we’re also okay with abysmally bad forms of identification (SSN, birth certificates).
So, yes, it is easy to guarantee that a mass database of biometric data isn't abused if you can prevent it from being gathered. We're making no efforts in that direction, so we're running every day towards a future in which the holder of such a database can deepfake anyone doing anything.