It's not clear to me where this article gets the idea of what the FBI wants. I haven't seen anything from the FBI or from Comey that indicates that they want to place limits on future cryptographics systems.
It even seems like Comey is aware that the particular technique he is asking Apple to use will not apply to future phones made by Apple, and that the reality is that cryptography will soon reach the point where the FBI will not be able to rely on decrypting data as part of their investigative approach.
Yes, if Apple creates this exploit, then that exploit will potentially be available to other state actors and criminal enterprises. But only for iPhones older than the 5s. Fundamentally, as other commenters have pointed out, this is not creating a backdoor -- this is using an existing backdoor to install a bigger backdoor. It is, of course, possible that in the future even newer iPhones might find themselves vulnerable to unauthorized decryption, but really, the FBI's ask in this particular case really is narrow in scope, because it does only apply to older phones.
I don't see the slippery slope here that many people seem to think exists. The slope begins and ends with a phone released in 2013. All any person (criminal or otherwise) has to do is buy a newer iPhone, and then this whole discussion no longer applies.
The issue isn't a technical one as much as a legal one. If the FBI can get the government to interpret the All Writs Act the way they want (any private entities must do what the govt says to aid a criminal investigation unless explicitly forbidden by law) to force Apple to write a custom version of iOS for them this time, the fear is that they can use the same law to install backdoors in ongoing versions. Legally there would be precedence for Apple to have to allow investigators to access other phones as well by means of making Apple write code to do so, which in the future could mean tracking location, turning on microphones and cameras, etc.
> the fear is that they can use the same law to install backdoors in ongoing versions
There is no reasonable interpretation of the All Writs Act (which regards subpeonas) that could be interpreted to force Apple to preemptively make their OS insecure. If they include a backdoor in future versions of the iPhone, or if the FBI discovers a vulnerability, then it is entirely possible that they could use the same precedent to force them to open the backdoor for them, or even give them a metaphorical prybar for the backdoor.
But the point is that Apple is rapidly moving towards (and in their opinion, has already achieved) a hard stop -- they no longer possess the technical capability to break a locked iPhone after the 5s. For a specific case, and a specific subpoena, there is no work that Apple can do to comply with the subpoena.
And, like I said, it seems clear that Comey understands this, and is not asking Apple to weaken security in the future, and I see no indications that he is asking for that.
Exactly. The slope begins with a phone released in 2013, but it doesn't end, ever - unless we can set the precedent now that Apple doesn't have to do this kind of thing.
The slippery slope fear is a bigger than which particular phone models will be made technically insecure by what the FBI is asking here and now in this case. The larger fear is the precedent that will be set by allowing such a ruling to stand--the strict legal precedent for cases much like this one, but also the momentum it will give to large agencies in the cultural fronts of the war against encryption.
I do understand what you are saying and it is precisely because of Director Comey's public statements on the matter that I called him an expert statesman in the article, which he is. The legal precedent set in this case when Apple is forced to comply will invariably change how companies implement cryptography within their systems.
It even seems like Comey is aware that the particular technique he is asking Apple to use will not apply to future phones made by Apple, and that the reality is that cryptography will soon reach the point where the FBI will not be able to rely on decrypting data as part of their investigative approach.
Yes, if Apple creates this exploit, then that exploit will potentially be available to other state actors and criminal enterprises. But only for iPhones older than the 5s. Fundamentally, as other commenters have pointed out, this is not creating a backdoor -- this is using an existing backdoor to install a bigger backdoor. It is, of course, possible that in the future even newer iPhones might find themselves vulnerable to unauthorized decryption, but really, the FBI's ask in this particular case really is narrow in scope, because it does only apply to older phones.
I don't see the slippery slope here that many people seem to think exists. The slope begins and ends with a phone released in 2013. All any person (criminal or otherwise) has to do is buy a newer iPhone, and then this whole discussion no longer applies.